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Abstract 
Previous commentaries in the Formulary Evaluation section of INNOVATIONS in Pharmacy have pointed to the lack of credibility in 
modeled claims for cost-effectiveness and associated recommendations for pricing by the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 
(ICER). The principal objection to ICER reports has been that their modeled claims fail the standards of normal science: they are best 
seen as pseudoscience. The purpose of this latest commentary is twofold: first, to review the latest report by the International Society 
for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR) on standards and value claims for modeling imaginary cost-per-quality life 
year (QALY) worlds in health technology assessments and (ii) given ICER’s commitment to ISPOR standards, to consider the credibility 
of ICER’s QALYs. The concern is that ICER gives the impression that there is a common and agreed utility metric to support QALY 
constructs and that there is an agreed standard for creating QALYs within the imaginary reference case meme. The purpose of this 
commentary is to emphasize that there is no ‘gold standard’ QALY, let alone a ‘gold standard’ utility metric. A QALY is what you assume 
the QALY should be; it is an artificial construct which allows any number of competing QALYs to be generated for the same target 
population under different imaginary constructs. Similar objections apply to the application of willingness-to-pay thresholds to support 
ICER’s business case as the sole arbiter, in pole position, of health technology assessments to support pricing recommendations. In the 
US.  A threshold has to be defined for the QALYs and costs captured, by assumption, within the model. Even for the same target patient 
population a $50,000 cost per QALY threshold will yield different pricing recommendations depending upon the assumptions driving 
the QALY estimate, such as choice of utility metric, time spent by stage of disease, frequency and severity of adverse events and costs. 
While this is an obvious point, it appears not to occur to those who, with a limited technical understanding of how the ICER model is 
constructed (and ICER is not given to extended technical explanations) take at face value the ICER imaginary construct and the QALY 
value judgements. Of course, it is also beside the point that the ICER reference case imaginary world was never intended to support 
empirical assessments of the claims made; we have no idea of whether it is right, if it is wrong and, over the lifetime perspective, we 
will never know and were never intended to know. 
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Introduction 
The business model of the Institute for Clinical and Economic 
Review (ICER) rests on the construction of imaginary 
incremental cost-per-QALY worlds. Previous commentaries in 
INNOVATIONS in Pharmacy have pointed to the fact that these 
constructions, which are widely accepted by mainstream health 
technology assessment groups such as the International Society 
for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR), fail 
to meet the standards or normal science; they are best 
described as pseudoscience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8.  They fail the 
demarcation test between science and non-science (cf. natural 
selection vs. intelligent design). While their supporters 
acknowledge that they fall outside of the normal activities of 
hypothesis testing in problem solving, the traditional way that 
science is seen to add to our knowledge base through an 
ongoing process of conjecture and refutation, the imaginary 
worlds of ICER may be conjectural but are impossible to refute. 
It is an analytical dead end. Unfortunately, while ICER’s 
adoption of the reference case construction kit for imaginary  
 
 
Corresponding author: Paul C Langley, PhD 
Adjunct Professor College of Pharmacy 
University of Minnesota 
Minneapolis MN 
Director, Maimon Research LLC; Tucson, AZ 
Email: langley@maimonresearch.com 
worlds fails to meet the standards of normal science, there are 
still those who are prepared to take this endeavor seriously.  
 
The purpose of this commentary, following from a previous 
commentary that reviewed the status of imaginary QALY 
claims, is to consider ICER’s embrace of the cost-per-QALY 
paradigm 9.  In this   arcane world  of constructing  imaginary  
worlds, ICER identifies and applies utility scores to estimate 
QALY gains over a timeframe that may extend for decades into 
the future. Claims are made for competing therapies from 
constructed incremental cost-per-QALY comparisons set 
against cost-per-QALY threshold values. What is often 
overlooked is that creating QALYs, the choice of utility metric 
and time spent in a modeled disease stage is entirely 
discretionary, as are the costs that the model builder may 
decide to include. This means that any arbitrary cost-per-QALY 
threshold (e.g., $50,000 per QALY) will yield different 
recommendations for price discounting depending on the 
model assumptions. To achieve comparable recommendations 
for discounting a product price, would require a threshold 
calibrated for the specific model construct, utility metric and 
costs.  
 
The critique presented in this commentary applies to reference 
case lifetime models irrespective of the type of modeling 
framework that is employed. Economic models can employ 
either a patient level simulation or a cohort level framework to 
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generate lifetime estimates of average direct medical costs and 
outcomes, typically expressed as comparative incremental 
cost-per-QALY projections 10. If patient level simulations or 
hybrid versions are seen as the preferred lifetime framework 
this does not mean that they can be absolved from application 
of the demarcation test. 
 
Unfortunately, as detailed here, falling back on the reference 
case as sufficient to drive comparable value judgements across 
disease areas and hypothetical target patient populations is a 
non-starter. Certainly, the authors of reference case guidelines 
may have sought to create a barrier against untoward 
competition in building lifetime imaginary worlds. 
Unfortunately, the reference case as a defense overlooks some 
significant methodological deficiencies, apart from its 
characterization as pseudoscience. It is certainly no defense 
against the proliferation of imaginary cost-effectiveness models 
that have dominated the literature over the past 30 years. 
 
ICER in its embrace and advocacy of the construction of 
imaginary cost-per-QALY health technology assessments is 
following the standards for constructing imaginary worlds put 
in place by the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics 
and Outcomes Research (ISPOR). These standards have been 
recently revisited and endorsed by ISPOR in as Special Task 
Force report. This commentary briefly reviews this report and 
its recommendations for enhanced value measures to 
complement the core cost-per-QALY imaginary framework. 
 
Central to this QALY critique of ICER imaginary model building 
is the audience for ICER value judgements, in particular the 
blanket use of the term QALY.  Perhaps inadvertently, the 
impression given is of a ‘unique’ metric that drives ICER’s 
modeled claims. If this is a perception, then it needs to be 
challenged. There is no unique, agreed QALY metric standard. 
Rather, there are a range of utility constructs, application of 
which would potentially yield competing QALY estimates.  
 
This is not to imply, however, that utility measures do not have 
a place in health technology assessment. There are abundant 
studies where patient reported outcomes (PRO) instruments 
have been utilized to evaluate competing claims. The key 
difference, however, is that these are evaluated in the context 
of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) and observational studies 
with claims to be evaluated that are credible, evaluable and 
replicable. 
 
ISPOR: State of the Art 
Claims by ICER that the construction of reference case, 
imaginary lifetime cost-per-QALY worlds is the ‘state of the art‘ 
in health technology assessment is quite accurate. The 
construction by assumption of imaginary worlds is not only 
endorsed by ISPOR and the Academy of Managed Care 
Pharmacy (AMCP) in the US but also by the overwhelming 
majority of assessment agencies for single payer health 
systems. 
 
Most recently, ISPOR has reaffirmed its commitment to the 
construction of imaginary worlds in a Special Task Force Report 
issued in 2018 11. This task force was convened to review 
relevant perspectives and appropriate approaches and methods 
to support the definition and use of high-quality value 
frameworks; presumably ‘high value’ imaginary constructs, 
although no criteria are suggested that may distinguish ‘high 
value’ from ‘low value’ imaginary worlds or how a metric might 
be applied to inform those willing to utilize imaginary worlds in 
formulary decisions.  
 
Expressing a concern that competing value frameworks in 
attempting to simplify the problem of value could end up 
making ad hoc assumptions and simplifications not supported 
by theory or evidence, the Report takes the position that 
frameworks that do not capture the full costs and benefits of 
treatment may distort decisions, although ‘full’ is not defined 
outside of broad reference case guidelines. The approach taken 
by ISPOR is ‘to define value on the basis of microeconomic 
principles, recognizing that value is best defined as what 
individuals (or others acting on their behalf) would be willing to 
pay to acquire more health care or other goods and services. 
This is best achieved, maintains the Report, by informing 
resource allocation decisions by ‘approximating’ the value of 
interventions in incremental cost per quality adjusted life year 
(QALY) term, capturing length and quality of life in an imaginary 
reference case construct. 
 
The Report points out that thousands of these cost-per-QALY 
analyses have been carried out and catalogued. One such 
catalogue is the Tufts University, Center for the Evaluation of 
Value and Risk in Health’s Cost Effectiveness analysis (CEA) 
Registry where the discerning builder of modeled imaginary 
worlds can scroll through hundreds of utility scores catalogued 
over the past 30 years and linked to diseases and disease stages 
to populate their model and generate QALYs 12. It is not clear, 
however, from the summary provided by the Center, the basis 
for the listed utility score. There appear to be no codes 
categorizing the utility metric (e.g., EQ-5D-5L vs. SF-6D) and its 
construction (e.g., choice of mapping function). Of course, 
reader can always refer back to the source study. The risk is that 
prospective users, in particular those constructing imaginary 
worlds, will take the scores at face value and populate their 
models accordingly. 
 
The ISPOR Report cautions, however, that while they believe 
cost-per-QALY claims are the key driver there are limitations to 
the metric. It may not fully capture: (i) the health or wellbeing 
of patients (and, presumably, caregivers); (ii) individual or 
community preferences for health state attributes; (iii) disease 
severity; (iv) equity of access; (v) unmet medical need and (vi) 
the perspective of the audience to whom the value claim is 
addressed: the patient, payer or society at large.  If the patient, 
including the caregiver in pediatric or younger adolescent 
populations, is the preferred perspective then there will exist 
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tensions as they do not necessarily meet the full costs of health 
interventions and may put to one side concerns regarding the 
opportunity costs of their choice. 
 
It is also recognized that within any disease area and for any 
target pharmaceutical product or device there is a range of 
options, not only for deciding which imaginary value framework 
is appropriate but also the perspective taken within that 
framework. Is the perspective that of the health plan, the 
patient, the health plan manager, the provider, the 
manufacturer, a special interest group, government regulators 
or society as a whole? The Report cautions, therefor, against 
attempts to create a single value-based metric that may put to 
one side variations in individual preferences, together with 
ability and willingness to pay.  
The Special Task Force Report also focuses on the range of value 
elements that might be captured in a technology assessment 13. 
In addition to the conventional elements that are included or 
considered for inclusion in modeled claims (QALYs, net costs, 
productivity and adherence improving factors) , the report also 
considers: reduction in uncertainty, fear of contagion, 
insurance value, severity of disease, value of hope, real option 
value, equity and scientific spillovers. While, inevitably, saying 
further research is warranted, the Report considers how these 
elements might be included in a cost-utility framework. Options 
canvassed are increasing the scope of the QALY measure, 
broadening health state descriptions or even utilizing multi-
criteria decision analysis (MCDA) [see below].  
The Special Task Force Report also considers how multiple 
elements of value might be combined into a single value metric 
for individuals 14. These include extended measures which 
attempt to describe the value of medical interventions along 
three dimensions: health gains, financial risk protection and 
social for population subgroups. While it is unclear how these 
might be aggregated to a single metric, the health gains are still 
assessed by a utility metric to generate QALYS or a similar 
measure.  Going beyond the three additional dimensions 
captured in the extended concept of value, the Report 
introduces the term augmented value to capture further 
dimensions of value. The possible list is extensive, including 
scientific spillovers, reducing diagnostic uncertainty and 
financial insurance value. This extended and augmented value 
concepts are still speculative and the Report acknowledges that 
they cannot  be fully aggregated (e.g., be monetized) across the 
various dimensions of value they describe. Finally, the Report 
suggests that if a single metric is the objective, we should 
consider MCDA, but without any firm direction of what the 
MCDA elements might be or the MCDA model most appropriate 
to creating a ‘weighted’ metric as well as addressing the critical 
issue of aggregating across individuals 15 16 
The last section of the Report considers more recently 
proposed value frameworks 17. The value frameworks reviewed 
include those of the American College of Cardiology/ American 
Heart Association, the Institute for Clinical and Economic 
Research, the American Society of Clinical Oncology, the 
National Comprehensive Cancer Network, and the Memorial 
Sloan Kettering Cancer Center. The assessment considers the 
diversity of frameworks presented in terms of their face and 
content validity, reliability and conceptual underpinning. In 
other words, do these value tools conform to mandated ISPOR 
standards. Not surprisingly, the ICER imaginary reference case 
incremental cost-per-QALY or cost-effectiveness analysis is 
seen as the standard for base health plan coverage as 
recommended in the Special Task Force Report. Value 
thresholds are a key input to coverage and reimbursement 
decisions with payers encouraged to introduce willingness-to-
pay or cost-per-QAL metrics or similar threshold decision tools 
given their opportunity costs and budget constraints. These 
may vary by patient as well as being modified by equity and 
severity considerations, although budget impact should not be 
an integral part of value assessment. The Report recommends 
structured deliberative processes for health together with a 
plea for exploring and testing novel elements of benefit.  
Mapping Health State Utilities   
The degree of acceptance of the imaginary world meme in 
health technology assessment is seen in the time and effort 
over the past 20 or more years to mapping health state utilities 
from non-preference based outcome measures together with 
attempts to crosswalk between generic preference based utility 
measures, notably the ongoing reviews of the impact of moving 
from the EQ-5D-3L to the EQ-5D-5L on modeled cost-
effectiveness claims. In the former case ISPOR has issued good 
practice guidelines for estimating the relationship between 
outcomes measured in clinical studies (e.g., RCTs) and health 
utility 18. This mapping allows clinical markers as inputs to 
equations to estimate utility score approximations which can 
then populate modeled incremental cost-per-QALY claims. 
Whether this effort has been rewarded if the objective is to 
populate a model and generate non-evaluable lifetime 
incremental values is, again, a moot point. In the latter case the 
introduction of the EQ-5D-5L in 2009 gave clinical researchers 
and health technology assessors the opportunity to use a 
potentially more sensitive instrument as the EQ-5D-3L was 
considered to have unacceptable floor and ceiling effects and 
to lack sensitivity as it only captured three responses to the five 
health dimensions: no problem, some problem and extreme 
problem. Unfortunately, the EQ-5D-5L with its five response 
levels created its own set of problems as attempts to rework 
previous modeled claims for cost-effectiveness using the 3L 
version pointed to significant differences with the re-modeled 
claims 19.  
Go Forth and Multiply 
While the Special Task Force Report asks (inevitably) for more 
research, the base case is a commitment to the application of a 
reference case to support imaginary incremental cost-per-QALY 
modeling supported by threshold decision criteria 20. Attempts 
to widen the scope of the metric employed to capture other 
dimensions, such as equity and disease severity as well as 
consideration of other perspectives and value frameworks that 
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may utilize MCDA, are still secondary to the imaginary 
incremental cost-per-QALY meme. 
Whether the research agenda proposed by the Special Task 
Force Report will ever have a practical import in health decision 
making outside of the activities of ISPOR and its academic 
following is a further moot point. At best, the existing value 
frameworks identified by the Report may continue to mature to 
include additional dimensions of interest, with special interest 
groups (e.g., in rare diseases) proposing value frameworks 
specific to the target patient populations. Even so, the question 
remains: will these be assessed with a framework for credible 
and evaluable claims or will health technology assessment 
continue to be dominated by the imaginary world meme.  
The Special Task Force Report does not address the question of 
the scientific status of the proposed value frameworks, notably 
those that promote the lifetime incremental cost-per-QALY as 
central to the decision problem. This is not surprising. After all, 
for the last 30 years cost-effectiveness, specifically in cost-
benefit or cost-utility analysis, the construction of imaginary 
worlds has been the mainstay of health technology assessment. 
To admit to the ISPOR global membership that claims from a 
lifetime cost-per-QALY model are not only impossible to 
evaluate but that they were never intended to support 
hypothesis testing would be embarrassing. While they are 
touted as ‘providing approximate information’ (whatever that 
means), the fact is that we will never, as already emphasized, 
intended to know if they were right or if they were wrong. We 
could create any number of competing cost-per-QALY models 
for the products in a disease area for a target population but 
would have no basis other than a comparison of assumptions 
to judge whether the information created by one model was 
preferable to another.  
There is no simple answer to the question of which preference 
based multi-attribute health status system to use, or whether 
to opt out.  As Drummond et al point out: (i) the decision does 
matter as the systems are far from identical, they differ in the 
health dimensions and levels assigned to each dimension, in the 
description of those levels and in the severity of the most 
severe level; (ii) they differ in the population surveyed in the 
construction of the system and the instruments used to 
determine the preference based scoring; and (iii) they differ in 
the theoretical approach taken to modeling the preference 
data into a scoring formula 21.   
The diversity of generic preference-based multi-attribute 
systems is not, of course, to endorse them in constructing 
imaginary cost-per-QALY worlds. While this meme has had 
widespread support as shown by, for example, the two US 
Panels on cost effectiveness of 1996 and 2016, together with 
the various do-it-yourself imaginary world construction 
textbooks, on the standards of normal science this approach to 
health technology assessment is best seen as pseudoscience 
(c.f., intelligent design) 22 23 24. Science is a process of discovery, 
not the creation of imaginary worlds. As Newton (Isaac Newton 
1642-1727 ), with Descartes as his target (René Descartes 1596-
1650 ) stated ‘hypotheses non fingo’   (I do not feign 
hypotheses) Descartes, in Newton’s view had ‘produced 
fantastic and untestable ideas, then assumed them to be true 
and used them as building blocks of his philosophy 25.   
Imaginary ICER Worlds 
ICER’s embrace of the imaginary worlds meme is consolidated 
in its so-called reference case. This sets out the standards for 
constructing imaginary worlds. Unlike NICE in the UK or other 
technology assessment agencies such as the PBAC in Australia, 
these reference case standards are not directed to 
manufacturers who have been asked to make modeled 
submission, but are directed to ICER itself (or, more accurately, 
the contracted groups at the universities of Washington, Illinois 
and Colorado who construct the imaginary models). ICER is 
always the final arbiter on the model although manufacturers 
and other stakeholders may offer suggestions   if they decide to 
engage with ICER in what many see as a non-productive activity. 
Few suggestions are taken up. 
Guidelines set out in the ICER reference case make it clear that 
wherever possible (with a few noted exceptions) ICER should 
strive in building its in-house model to generate its QALY 
estimates from either generic health preferences captured 
directly from the a representative sample of the US or mapped 
from clinical markers.  As ICER states: 
 
• Health preferences should reflect those of the general 
US population (preferably), providing a rationale if 
patients with the condition, individuals at heightened 
disease risk, or a different population is used 
• Health preferences should be from an indirect method of 
measurement based on a generic measurement system 
(e.g. EQ-5D-5L) 
• When there are challenges to outcome measures used in 
clinical trials and available patient-reported data 
translating into QALYs, mapping studies that allow 
translation of surrogate outcomes into quality of life 
measures should be considered 
• If using ultra rare disease framework, acknowledge and 
highlight additional uncertainty in translating additional 
outcomes into QALY measures 26 
 
Although it appears implicit in the ICER reports that the EQ-5D 
is the preferred generic preference metric, it is not clear 
whether it is the EQ-5D-3L or the EQ-5D-5L  that is preferred. 
As it stands these two versions of the EQ-5D should be seen as 
separate instruments. Certainly it is possible to crosswalk and 
the EUROQoL group has produced value set tables for the EQ-
5D-5L cross walked with the EQ-5D-3L 27.   In the case of NICE 
the present position (October 2019) is that the preferred 
measure of health-related quality of life in adults is the EQ-5D-
3L value set for reference case purposes 28. If data are collected 
using the EQ-5D-5L system, utility values in reference case 
analyses should be calculated by mapping the descriptive 
system data to the 3L value set. The selected mapping function 
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is that developed by Van Hout 29. In prospective clinical studies 
the EQ-5D-5L descriptive system is supported.  
  
If a cost-effective model framework has been developed which 
provides for the assessment of credible, evaluable and 
replicable claims for target populations across disease areas 
then the analyst is open to utilizing a preference-based multi-
attribute system for health related quality of life (HRQoL)  
outcmes. If issues are raised as to the relevance of the 
established generic instruments, then options are open to 
either augment the health dimensions or substitute a disease 
specific instrument. This may not be a generic instrument but a 
disease specific one which may be independent of generic 
measures or an addendum to those measures. Indeed, there is 
a substantive literature questioning the relevance of generic 
instruments to both HRQoL and QoL considerations in disease 
states. This does not apply just to rare diseases that impose a 
substantial burden on caregivers and the wider family (e.g., 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, sickle cell disease), but to more 
prevent disease states such as schizophrenia and, more 
generally, the range of mental health conditions 30. Perhaps 
ICER should be advised that a one-size reference case 
construction kit for imaginary worlds (with presumably the EQ-
5D-3L as the ‘preferred’ metric) does not fit all and that 
persevering with arguments that, by ad hoc additions, where 
other considerations might be set alongside the core imaginary 
value judgements, is an analytical dead-end.  
 
But this is not all. Even if a specific preference metric were 
mandated, any modeled claim could be challenged on the 
grounds that: (i) the modeled assumptions and particular 
mathematical form of the model (e.g., Markov process) will 
generate time spent on average for a hypothetical target 
population in a disease stage that is only one of many other 
potentially modeled stages and (ii) in assessing the numerator 
of the incremental claims, the assumptions made regarding  
which medical inputs and their projected unknown lifetime 
costs are modeled are again open to a range of constructs. 
Rather than seeking to add to our knowledge of cost-
effectiveness claims and the most effective way of presenting 
these claims to formulary committees (e.g., as modeled 
extensions of RCTs) the technology assessment meme directs 
its followers to the construction of imaginary world where each 
imaginary world for a target population is one of a potential 
multiverse of models and non-evaluable value judgements for 
competing products in that therapy area. 
 
If the focus of criticisms of ICER is the QALY, then the criticism 
should be more focused on the utility construct, the estimated 
average time spent in a disease stage and the assumptions 
underpinning the selection and valuing of direct medical costs. 
ICER needs to inform patient advocacy groups who may raise 
issues regarding the relevance of the utility construct to HRQoL 
or QoL that either (i) ICER is wedded to a specific generic 
measures (e.g., EQ-5D-3L) and will not countenance any 
deviation or (ii) that it recognizes that as threshold values  
are unique to individual models that it will accept 
recommendations for other utility metrics in creating an 
imaginary world.  
 
The Universal QALY Threshold 
Adoption of willingness-to-pay thresholds implies that a 
common generic metric should be mandated in model 
construction. In the US, with the requirement for US 
preferences, the choice is between, in practical terms, the SF-
6D and the EQ-5D-3L/5L 31 32 33 34. If one instrument is 
mandated, then utility scores embedded in the model should 
only be those that are generated by this instrument or mapped 
to that instrument. Combining scores from different 
instruments, let alone scores which fail to meet US preference 
standards, should be put to one side. As ICER controls the 
construction of imaginary worlds this should not be an obstacle. 
There is, of course, no reason ICER has to follow its own 
standards. In fact, ICER has cobbled together scores from 
different instrument on grounds that they will give similar 
scores - an example is the ICER evidence report for oral 
semaglutide in Type 2 diabetes 35 . 
In the case, as noted above of the EQ-5D-3L and the EQ-5D-5L 
it should be made clear that the two instruments will yield 
different utility scores and hence QALY claims, ceteris paribus, 
for the same stage of disease in the same target population. If 
the object is to generate identical recommendations for price 
discounting irrespective of the generic measure then the ICER 
willingness-to-pay threshold(s) must accommodate this with 
different generic utility measures mapped to specific 
thresholds. A $50,000 threshold for one metric will not yield the 
same price discounting claims as the same threshold for a 
competing metric in the same disease state. Indeed, it would be 
possible to take the ICER model final version and substitute 
utility scores from other generic instruments, to include the 
possible specific form of mapping algorithm. This would result 
in decision makers having the option of choosing between 
modeled imaginary worlds and associated value judgments.  
ICER’s much published value judgements for threshold based 
price discounting are a mirage. Unless the threshold is specific 
to a QALY measures (which involves not just the selected metric 
system but the consistent use of direct medical cost estimates 
and the underlying model that constructs time spent in 
different health states over the hypothetical average lifetime of 
the hypothetical target patient population) then the application 
of a fixed threshold across products in the various disease areas 
has no validity. A threshold only has relevance in its relation to 
the model driving the specific QALY estimates and the 
estimated direct medical costs. If different models are 
constructed within a disease area, a common recommendation 
for price discounting will be driven by thresholds specific to the 
various imaginary world constructs.  
Of course, given the imaginary nature of the modeled QALY 
claim, ICER could put aside its commitment to generic US 
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preference based utilities by stage of disease drawn from the 
literature, to simply assuming arbitrarily that a utility score is 
‘approximate’ and reflects the modeler’s judgment that it is a 
‘reasonable proxy’. As it stands, ICER’s position that it is 
consistent in applying across the board the same cost-per-QALY 
thresholds ($50,000, $100,000 and $150,000) to support 
recommendations for price discounting is misleading as it is 
virtually impossible to apply the reference case to support 
identical model structures and assumptions.  
In practice, unfortunately, the ICER contracted model builders 
have not adopted a standard utility measure. Rather, as 
suggested by the various evidence reports, the model builders 
seek out utility metrics where they can find them from a disease 
specific literature review. Whether the metric is the EQ-5D-3L, 
the EQ-5D-5L or the HUI Mk3, ICER modelers rely on being able 
to extract scores from the literature. The selected scores 
depend upon what the model builders can find rather than an 
a priori justification for the relevance (or otherwise) of the 
metric in that disease state and the appropriateness of a 
preference based instrument in that disease state. A further 
potential complication that abstracting utility measures 
mapped or reported from clinical trials or observational studies 
reported in the literature for a disease state, may not match the 
characteristics of the ICER assumed target population or 
modeled disease stage. The added complication is that even if 
ICER explicitly mandated the EQ-5D-3L in the reference case, it 
has not mandated the mapping algorithm that is appropriate 
(or criteria to be applied) when it is modeling different disease 
states.  As the ISPOR Task Force Report on mapping makes 
clear, if a mapping algorithm is required (or selected from the 
literature) it has to be justified with an audit trail detailing its 
choice. 
If a generic instrument is judged by patient groups to only 
encompass a minimum set of disease experience attributes, 
then it may reasonably be argued that there is little difference 
between an arbitrary choice of generic instrument and the 
adoption of a disease specific metric from an on-line catalogue 
such as the Tufts utility emporium. This opens, to apply a cliché, 
Pandora’s Metric QALY box to address the more pertinent 
question of why, in constructing cost-effectiveness claims we 
focus on QALYs when the outcomes, in a lifetime framework, 
not only lack credibility but are, by definition, impossible to 
evaluate empirically and replicate across target patient 
populations. The ICER imaginary world is but one more addition 
to a shelf of existing imaginary worlds, none of which can be 
judged to be necessarily more ‘informative’ or ‘realistic’ than 
any other. It would be just as appropriate to select one at 
random. 
It is difficult to see how ICER might escape from this 
predicament. Mandating a generic instrument raises two 
problems: (i) there may not be evidence on generic utility 
metrics from the literature to support ‘assumptions’ to 
populate the imaginary world of a specific target population in 
a disease area (unless any assumption for scores ‘will do’) and 
(ii) there may not be an algorithm, specific to a disease area, 
that maps the utility score from the specific study to the 
mandated ICER ‘gold standard’ utility score. In the case, for 
example, of the EQ-5D-5L metric with US preferences, there are 
unlikely  to be more than a handful (if that) of published studies 
that would allow utility scores to be plucked from the literature 
for inclusion in the imaginary world model. Falling back on the 
EQ-5D-3L then raises the issue, as detailed above, that the two 
are effectively separate systems. Although ICER takes 
approximately 8 months to produce a final evidence report for 
public review and then voting by a selected group of experts, it 
is unlikely that ICER would allocate time and resources to meet 
evidence gaps. Rather, ICER attempts to populate its reference 
case; falling back reluctantly is it appears on review that the 
evidence base is too weak to support the lifetime incremental 
imaginary world (as witnessed in the recent withdrawal and 
reissue of the JAK inhibitors  in rheumatoid arthritis evidence 
report) 36   .   
 
Conclusions 
If ICER value judgements are built on nothing more than a series 
of assumptions, where each model relies on a different set of 
assumptions, a point that might be of interest to those wishing 
to examine the entrails of ICER’s imaginary worlds, is to 
consider the choice of assumption. After all, if the object is to 
convince, possibly by now a somewhat skeptical audience, of 
the importance of providing policy makers with constructed 
information from imaginary worlds, what are the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for the model structure and the ‘verified’ 
assumptions: Gormenghast or Narnia? Both require a 
suspension of belief yet both embody assumptions and 
characterizations that have ‘real world’ analogs (although Aslan 
is a stretch). 
 
Unfortunately, for those such as ISPOR and ICER who argue for 
the ‘state of the art’ imaginary world meme, the reference case 
is not a robust enough framework to fall back on in justifying an 
incremental cost-per-QALY, threshold driven approach to cost-
effectiveness.  It is not just the argument for a ‘master’ metric. 
In the case of NICE, the EQ-5D-3L is the mandated metric; or at 
least until there is an agreement on a value scoring for the EQ-
5D-5L.  Apart from the issue of the choice of mapping algorithm 
where, as occurs in most cases, the metric is created from 
clinical markers, there is the wider issue of bringing together 
other elements to create QALYs for a cost-per-QALY estimate. 
This brings into question the structure of the model and the 
assumptions populating the model. Not least is the bizarre 
requirement that the model should track, in chronic disease 
states, the natural course of the disease (the lifetime 
perspective). Believers presumably accept at face value that it 
is possible to make ‘reasonable’ or ‘realistic’ assumptions about 
the future, although the ICER reference case puts to one side 
modeling pharmaceutical price increases. Is the model meant 
to be ‘realistic’ or not? Is it just an artificial construct that meets 
certain speculative standards and which is just one imaginary 
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future world among other equally valid, by assumption, 
imaginary future worlds? This is not an issue for NICE as the 
submission and review process ensures that there is a ‘NICE 
approved’ imaginary world. All parties accept this and the 
resulting threshold implications for pricing. The playing field is 
level and all parties know the rules of the ‘game’. There are 
even imaginary world referees, typically in academic 
institutions, who will adjudicate the manufacturer’s imaginary 
submission. They can pronounce whether it is acceptable, 
modifiable or should be replaced by the referees own proposal 
for an imaginary world. NICE, as senior referee, is the final 
judge. 
ICER is in a quite different position: it has no legislative or 
regulatory mandate for its assumed role in health technology 
assessment. It faces a further hurdle that under the   Affordable 
Care and Patient Protection Act (2010) it is made clear  that the 
Patient Centered Outcomes Research Group (PCORI) exclude 
discounted cost-per-QALY or similar measures for threshold 
values for priority setting by the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services  37. Even putting this hurdle to one side, the 
objections to the construction of imaginary worlds should alert 
health decision makers to the inadvisability of the ICER 
reference case to drive formulary decisions. While this does not 
mean an objection in principle to the application of cost-per-
QALY models that generate credible and evaluable claims, 
supporting scientific discovery, but the rejection of the 
anachronistic and counter-productive role that ICER has taken 
upon itself in health decision making. 
Unfortunately, few recipients of the ICER evidence reports 
seem to be interested in or willing to question the lack of 
scientific status in the ICER reference case. Decision makers 
‘take ICER’s word for it’; a belief that, in some sense, the ICER 
imaginary construct, as one of a possible multiverse of 
competing imaginary worlds and value judgements, is ‘useful’ 
information. ICER clinical assessments, pricing and affordability 
are reported through the media and taken up by decisions 
makers who are typically not in a position to undertake a post-
mortem of the ICER model. As noted in previous commentaries, 
the scientific revolution of the 17th century was built on the 
construction of empirically verifiable theories and 
hypotheses38. As evidence for this consider the motto of the 
Royal Society (founded 1660; Royal Charter 1662) nullius in 
verba (take no man’s word for it)39. 
 
If we are concerned with the growth of knowledge in health 
technology assessment, then a discussion of the use of utility 
metrics and QALYs in the imaginary worlds of ICER seems 
pointless. After all, the construction of imaginary worlds, even 
if defended on the grounds that they represent the ‘state of the 
art’ in the consensus on health technology assessment, 
represent an analytical dead end and should be abandoned.  
Against this there are certainly many analysts that would accept 
the information role of imaginary worlds or at least have a 
vested interest, after 30 years and thousands of published 
imaginary models, in affirming that the emperor is well dressed 
despite claims to the contrary. ICER has an undeniable impact 
with many prepared to defend ICER’s recommendations, 
including retail groups such as CVS 40. That being said, one way 
of illustrating the inevitable shortcomings of imaginary 
constructs is to point out that any finite number of observations 
can be proved to be accommodated within an indefinitely large 
number of different explanations (Gottfried Liebniz 1646-
1716). The ICER imaginary world is only one of many. These 
alternative explanations can claim to be ‘realistic’ yet rely on 
plucking a competing set of utility scores from the literature. 
Formulary committees could then select, from the range of 
possible imaginary worlds, which imaginary world’s 
information they feel most comfortable with and its attendant 
non-evaluable incremental cost-per-QALY claims. Or, they 
could reject the ICER approach and ask for credible and 
evaluable claims. 
 
ICER, of course, will continue to construct imaginary worlds, 
produce evidence reports and after their 8 month process of 
review, issue imaginary value judgements for pricing and access 
based on willingness to pay thresholds. There is a responsibility, 
therefore, to point out, even if we object to the relevance of 
constructing imaginary worlds, that there is no unique QALY 
measure. Competing measures will lead to different imaginary 
claims. Even if ICER mandated, for example, the EQ-5D-3L as the 
relevant utility measure to generate imaginary QALYs, any 
conclusion could be challenged on the grounds that the as a 
generic measure it fails to capture relevant aspects of either 
QoL or HRQoL within that disease state. ICER is in a no win 
position. To which might be added the fact that, unless directly 
administered to a target patient population, the claimed EQ-
5D-3L is a product of the analysts choice of mapping algorithm. 
Different algorithms will generate different utility scores with 
the inevitable debate over which mapping algorithm is 
econometrically robust and yield the ‘best fit’.  
 
Even if ICER, under pressure, abandoned a mandated EQ-5D-3L 
and recognized a role for disease specific instruments, the 
situation would not change. There would be a continuing 
debate over the relevance of disease specific instruments with 
the added complication that there are many disease states, 
notably in rare diseases, where there is no utility metric.  
 
Similar arguments could be made against any of the 
assumptions made to support ICER’s imaginary claims. The 
model structure can be challenged, assumptions regarding 
costs can be challenged and attempts by ICER to hide behind 
alternative scenarios and the application of probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis, can all be challenged. This brings us back to 
the fundamental point: creating imaginary worlds by 
assumption to influence pricing and access decisions is to 
acknowledge the appropriateness of Bentham’s (Jeremy 
Bentham 1748-1832) memorable phrase for the technology 
assessment meme:  ‘nonsense on stilts’. Or, to consider earlier 
memorable remarks, Kepler’s (Johannes Kepler 1571-1630) 
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comment on Fludd (Robert Fludd 1574 – 1637) the English 
alchemist and Rosicrucian with whom he had a long standing 
and acrimonious relationship: It is obvious he derives his main 
pleasure from unintelligible charades about the real world, 
whereas my purpose is, on the contrary, to draw the obscure 
facts of nature into the bright light of knowledge 25.  
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